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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








LAS VEGAS SPORTS NEWS, L.L.C., 
d/b/a LAS VEGAS SPORTING NEWS, 
       Appellant. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 98-cv-05768) 
District Judge: Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman 
 
Argued: January 13, 2000 
 
Before: Alito, Barry and Aldisert, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 28, 2000) 
 
ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION 
 
It is HEREBY ORDERED that the Slip Opinion filed in 
this case on April 28, 2000, be amended as follows: 
 
(1) Page 2, para. 1 ("The issue on appeal . . .") should be 
deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following two 
paragraphs: 
 
In 1886 the phrase "The Sporting News" was granted 
federal trademark protection and since that time it has 
been the banner headline of a weekly publication entitled 
The Sporting News. The mark is now owned by its 




requires us to decide if Times Mirror was entitled to a 
preliminary injunction enjoining a publisher from using the 
name Las Vegas Sporting News. 
 
Applying the relatively new Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c) ("FTDA" or "Act"), the 
district court issued the injunction against Las Vegas 
Sports News, L.L.C., d/b/a Las Vegas Sporting News 
("LVSN"), from using the name on its weekly sports-betting 
publication. The court concluded that Times Mirror was 
likely to succeed on the merits of its dilution claim against 
LVSN, because the mark was "famous" in its niche market 
and LVSN's use of the title on its publication diluted the 
Times Mirror's mark by blurring its distinctiveness. 
 
(2) Page 3, Section I, first para. ("In 1886. . .") should be 
deleted without replacement. 
 
(3) Page 14, Section IV, second para. ("To be sure, 
S 1125(c)(1) . . .") should be deleted and replaced with the 
following four paragraphs: 
 
The federal dilution statute must not be considered in 
vacuo, especially where as here the senior mark is 
registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The 
trademark registration statute 15 U.S.C. S 1052 emphasizes 
that a mark that is "merely descriptive" shall not be entitled 
to federal registration, see S 1052(e), unless the mark 
acquires secondary meaning. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's 
Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978). We 
have already demonstrated in Part III.B.1, supra , that "The 
Sporting News" has acquired secondary meaning and"has 
become distinctive" in its market. SeeS 1052(f) ("[N]othing 
in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used 
by the applicant which has become distinctive of the 
applicant's goods in commerce."). 
 
J. Thomas McCarthy, the leading commentator on the 
subject, states: 
 
        In the author's view, there is in [S 1125(c)(1)] no 
       separate statutory requirement of "distinctiveness," 
       apart from a finding that the designation be a"mark" 
       that is "famous." "Distinctiveness" is used here only as 
       a synonym for "fame." Even if "distinctiveness" is 
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       regarded as a separate requirement, it would, in the 
       author's view, be redundant. To be a "mark" eligible in 
       the first place for protection under [S 1125(c)(1)], basic 
       trademark principles dictate that a designation has to 
       be "distinctive" either inherently or through acquisition 
       of secondary meaning. 
 
4 McCarthy, supra, S 24:91 (footnotes omitted).1 
 
McCarthy explains the legislative history behind 
S 1125(c)(1)'s "distinctive and famous" language: 
 
        The 1987 Trademark Review Commission Report, the 
       genesis of the language contained in the 1996 federal 
       Act, said that the dual mention of both "distinctive and 
       famous" in the introduction to the list of factors was 
       inserted to emphasize the policy goal that to be 
       protected, a mark had to be truly prominent and 
       renowned. The double-barreled language "distinctive 
       and famous" reflected the goal that protection should 
       be confined to marks "which are both distinctive, as 
       established by federal registration at a minimum, and 
       famous, as established by separate evidence." The 
       Commission inserted the term "distinctive" as 
       hyperbole to emphasize the requirement that the mark 
       be registered, for without inherent or acquired 
       distinctiveness, the designation would not have been a 
       mark that should have federally registered in thefirst 
       place. The Trademark Review Commission Report 
       reveals that the Commission saw distinctiveness and 
       fame as two sides of the same evidentiary coin which 
       requires widespread and extensive customer 
       recognition of the plaintiff 's mark. However, when in 
       the 1995 House amendment, the requirement of federal 
       registration was dropped from the Bill, Congress 
       neglected to also drop the mention of "distinctive" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Trademark Review Commission Report, the impetus behind the 
FTDA, stated: "The same type of evidence which is traditionally used to 
prove distinctiveness can be used to prove fame. Although the registrant 
is not required to prove distinctiveness apart from the import of 
registration, any additional evidence of distinctiveness will ordinarily 
be 
entitled to substantial weight." Report of the Trademark Review 
Commission, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 459-460 (1987). 
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       introducing the list of factors. Thus, the word 
       "distinctive" was left floating in the statute, unmoored 
       to either any statutory requirement or underlying 
       policy goal. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that a mark be subject 
to separate tests for fame and distinctiveness. In any event, 
we have already addressed in separate contexts the 
famousness and distinctiveness of "The Sporting News." See 
supra Part III.A (fame in niche market); supra Part III.B.I 
(distinctiveness acquired from secondary meaning). Having 
decided that Times Mirror has proved that its mark had 
gained secondary meaning and a high degree of 
distinctiveness in the market, there is no necessity for 
proving an additional test of distinctiveness. See Viacom, 
Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 890 n.6 (8th 
Cir. 1998). 
 
(4) Page 15, Section V, para. 2 ("Before discussing . . ."), 
delete the first three sentences of this paragraph without 
replacement; and on Page 18, Section V, one sentence after 
the citation to the District Court Opinion (D. Ct. Op.), delete 
the sentence "Although the district court applied. . . by 
blurring its distinctive qualities" without replacement. 
 
(5) Page 18, Section V, first full para. on the page ("Actual 
confusion has been shown . . .") should be deleted without 
replacement. 
 
(6) Page 18, Section V, second full para. on the page 
("Finally, Times Mirror did not . . .") should be deleted 
without replacement. 
 
       By the Court: 
 
       /s/ Ruggero J. Aldisert 
 
       Circuit Judge 
 
Dated: May 3, 2000 
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